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This article explains the main features of the sterilized intervention in the foreign
exchange market and the use of non-conventional policy instruments as applied by
the Central Reserve Bank of Peru in order to avoid credit booms or busts in a
context of a partially dollarized nancial system. This monetary policy framework
is based on a risk management approach that includes as the main policy tool
the short-term interest rate within an ination targeting regime. This framework
helped to reduce the impact of the recent global nancial crisis on the Peruvian
economy and allowed to rejoin the path of growth with low ination, avoiding major
disruptions from the surge of capital inows.
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zCentral Bank of Peru.1 Introduction
This article explains the main features of the sterilized intervention in the foreign ex-
change market by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCR), in a context of an economy
with a nancial system that operates with two currencies. The possibility that local
banks can extend credit in foreign currency complicates the normal transmission mecha-
nisms of the monetary policy because on the one hand the policy rate cannot aect these
ows and its interest rate, and on the other, a sharp depreciation can produce a credit
contraction resulting from the deterioration of the quality of the assets of banks linked
to balance sheet eects on the partially dollarized non-nancial private sector portfolio
of assets and liabilities.
As a result of the risks and vulnerabilities related with partial dollarization, the BCR
has adopted a policy framework that adds to the conventional policy rate as a tool, sev-
eral instruments that can be grouped as quantitative or non conventional instruments.
For example, higher reserve requirements on short term foreign exchange liabilities are
used to modulate this source of credit, also the BCR intervenes in the foreign exchange
market sterilizing the excess of liquidity with its own instruments that are restricted to
local participants. Foreign exchange intervention is aimed to reduce the volatility of the
exchange rate and to accumulate international reserves, without any type of signalling or
commitment about the level or tendency of the exchange rate.
This policy framework has allowed the BCR to prevent major disruptions from the recent
global nancial crisis, and has allowed it to maintain the ow of credit during this event.
Additionally, the conventional transmission mechanism is in place with the interest rate
as the instrument to control ination.
In this article we discuss four issues related with this policy framework. First, we discuss
the selection of a discretionary type of FOREX intervention vis-a-vis a rule-based one.
Second, we revise issues related to sterilization with respect to its cost, the instruments
used and the degree of access to non residents. Third, we revise the use of reserve
requirements as a complement to the conventional policy rate tool. Finally, we asses the
issue of competitiveness in an environment marked by strong capital ows.
2 Monetary Policy under Partial Dollarization
A persistent high ination and severe macroeconomic imbalances in Peru during the 1970s
and 1980s, and the lack of ination-adjusted instruments led households to hold foreign
currency as store of value. This process of nancial dollarization increased signicantly
during the hyperination of 1988-90. In the years that followed, a wide-ranging package
of reforms in the nancial system and in the conduct of monetary and scal policy was
introduced to stabilize the economy. After achieving macroeconomic stabilization during
the 1990s, the BCR implemented in 2002 a fully edged ination targeting regime with
an initial point target of 2:5% and, since 2007, a continuous point target of 2:0%, both
with a tolerance range of 1%. As a result, during the last decade the average annual
ination rate has been 2:3%. However, despite improved economic conditions and stable
macroeconomic fundamentals during the last 20 years, inertia, transaction costs and a
still underdeveloped capital markets explain the slow, but continuous, decline of the im-
2portance of deposits and credits in dollars from a peak of 82% in 1999 to 44% in 2010
(Figure 1).
Dollarization magnies the reaction of nancial intermediaries to sharp movements in
their funding or to high exchange rate volatility. As a result, the economy is prone to
credit booms and busts associated to ows of foreign currency deposits, foreign credit
lines or other capital ows; and to exchange rate movements that aect the quality of the
credit portfolio. Dollarisation therefore alters the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and increases the liquidity and solvency risks of the nancial system:
 The maturity mismatch generated in foreign currency introduces higher liquidity
risks.
 Solvency risk increases when the assets of non nancial economic agents are mainly
denominated in domestic currency, while their liabilities are dollar-denominated.
Figure 1: Peru: Credit Dollarisation, 1993-2010 (As percentage of total credit)
After various external shocks, especially the Russian crisis of 1998, the BCR designed an
action plan to prevent a credit contraction during events of nancial stress. Henceforth,
the monetary policy framework in Peru, in addition to the common features of an ina-
tion targeting regime, began to include a set of measures to deal with the risks of nancial
dollarization. The strategy included three levels of liquidity: accumulation of interna-
tional reserves by the BCR; high liquidity requirements of nancial intermediaries; and a
solid public sector nancial position, resulting from the disciplined and coordinated scal
policy. In line with this strategy, international reserves increased from 12:9% of GDP in
December 1994 to 28:8% in December 2010 (Figure 2).
3Figure 2: Peru: Net International Reserves (In Millions of US$ and as % of GDP)
The set of monetary policy instruments can be separated in the normal price instrument
of the interest rate and the non conventional quantitative ones like the reserve require-
ment or the structure of the Central Bank balance sheet. The importance of the latter
group of policies has gained attention with the innovative actions performed by central
banks during the sub-prime nancial crisis that were aimed to avoid or limit a collapse
of credit. The motivation to consider measures which act more directly over the ows of
credit -rather than waiting for the more indirect impact through changes in interest rates-
is that during credit booms or crunches, short-term interest rates became less eective
in signaling the stance of the monetary policy to nancial intermediaries that become
insensitive to policy actions based on movements in the interest rate but more inclined
to react to changes in expectations and risk appetite.
The quantitative instruments are part of a more ample risk management approach of
monetary policy that includes preventive and corrective measures oriented to avoid a
credit boom or crunch and to preserve the transmission mechanisms of the monetary
policy and nancial stability. Figure 3 illustrates the common transmission mechanism
of the monetary policy working from changes in the short term interest rate to ination
through its impact on the output gap, but adding the eect of the non- conventional
quantitative policies impacting banking credit, and in this way on the output gap and
the ination rate.
4Figure 3: Transmission Mechanisms of Monetary Policy
3 Forex Intervention
Interventions in the FOREX market by the BCR are aimed to reduce the volatility of
the exchange rate but without signaling or committing to a certain level of the exchange
rate. A predictable exchange rate would in practice transform the exchange rate system
into a form of a pegged exchange type, and with that ensure success of one-sided bets
by speculators, and thus transforming the intervention into a fruitless eort. One way
to avoid predictability and to reinforce the central bank's commitment only to price sta-
bility is to use a rule-type of intervention, based for example on pre-announced amounts
of foreign exchange purchases in the market. However, it is possible that dierent events
can make intervention either unnecessary or insucient, forcing the bank to abandon or
change the rule. An alternative type of intervention is one that is more discretionary, in
which having a clear idea that it is important to avoid signaling an exchange rate, the
central bank is able and willing to engage in FOREX operations without a pre-announced
amount of operations.
The main type of FOREX intervention is through direct operations with commercial
banks in the spot market and at the prevailing exchange rate. Additionally, the BCR can
make swaps through temporary purchases or sales of foreign currency, using an auction
procedure. The latter instrument is used in the case when the forwards market in foreign
currency is putting pressure on the exchange positions of local banks. It is also important
to consider that at maturity the swaps can be renewed or just be exercised, having both
possibilities the same characteristic as an intervention in the market
Figure 4 illustrates the momentum of and the types of FOREX intervention of the BCR
5together with the evolution of the exchange rate since 2007. Three clear episodes can
be identied, rst before the collapse of Lehman, second after the collapse, and third
after the announcement of the second round of quantitative easing by the FED (QE2).
It is also identies the direct intervention in the foreign exchange spot market, and the
placements or maturing swap operations. During these three stages, the Central Bank
did not attempted to reverse the tendencies, but to reduce the degree of volatility. It can
also be noticed that the daily amount of interventions does not follow any type of rule.
Figure 4: Peru: Exchange rate and Central Bank net forex intervention (Ex-
change rate in PEN Soles per US Dollar, and forex interventions in millions of US Dollars)
Table 1 shows the three recent stages of surges and contractions of capital ows, how
they materialize in the exchange markets and the amount of FOREX intervention by the
BCR. The amount of purchases were US$ 8,7 billion before Lehman and US$ 6,5 billion
(including US$ 0,2 billion in swaps) with the arrival of signals of normalization and the
announcement and implementation of the QE2. On the opposite side, during the period
of acute crisis in the last quarter of 2009, the BCR sold US$ 4,8 billion totaling US$ 8,0
billion if we include the US$ 3,2 billion in balances at maturity of swaps.
The BCR's FOREX intervention has been eective in reducing the volatility of the Peru-
vian Sol. As Figure 5 shows, the Peruvian currency has been very stable in comparison
with those of other countries in the region. The coecient of variability has been close
to 4% whereas for other economies it has reached values between 8% and 13%.
6Table 1: Peru: Spot and Forward Foreign Exchange Markets (In millions of US dollars)
Figure 5: Nominal Exchange Rate (variability coecient, SD/Average)
4 Sterilization
To avoid side eects of FOREX intervention on the ability to control the ination, the
central bank needs a sucient capacity for sterilization. There are two crucial factors
that helped to accomplish this goal in the case of Peru: a solid scal position and the
increasing demand for monetary base. In table 2, a simplied balance sheet of the BCR
is presented in terms of percentages of the GDP, where it can be noticed that the scal
7deposits in the bank represents 10% of GDP which is close to 35% of the size of the
international reserves. The scal contribution to sterilize the liquidity created by the
intervention in the exchange rate market also helps to reduce the pressure on the real
exchange rate.
Table 2: Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Peru
Sterilized interventions should not aect the ability to use the short-term interest rate
as a policy tool. To assess the impact of FOREX intervention on the variability of
the interest rate, we computed a ratio indicating the relative volatility of the interbank
interest rate related to the variability of the exchange rate in dierent economies with
oating exchange rate. Figure 6 indicates that Peru has the lowest ratio.
Figure 6: Volatility of Interest Rate (Relative to Volatility of Exchange Rate)
Another concern about sterilization is the nancial cost from the carry cost or interest
rate dierential from the returns of the international reserves with the interest rate paid
to the dierent liabilities of the central bank. In a situation with higher local interest
rates, the central bank could face nancial losses. One component that eases this burden
is the currency which is a liability free of interest rate. As it is shown in Figure 7, the
return on the foreign assets held by the BCR exceeds the average cost of its liabilities1.
1With respect to the exchange rate losses that can be generated by a currency appreciation on
international reserves valued in local currency, there is not a consensus about the accounting treatment
8Figure 7: Central Bank NIR Yields and Cost of Funds
Finally, an important issue with sterilized interventions is that they can create an incen-
tive to attract further capital inows due to the interest rate dierential between the local
and international interest rates. This possibility could neutralize the monetary policy,
either by paralyzing the use of the policy rate or by attracting further foreign nancing.
These capital ows have as an additional incentive the expectation of appreciation of the
local currency.
The recent episodes of surge of capital inows before the Lehman collapse and with the
QE2, has been reected in Peru in the growth of the demand of dierent nancial instru-
ments in local currency by non-resident participants, including the sterilization papers
of the central bank. To avoid the circularity of sterilized intervention attracting more
capital inows, the central bank implemented the following measures: (a) Imposition of a
4% fee for the purchase or sale of BCR paper to participants dierent than local nancial
institutions in order to reduce the re-sale to non-resident players; (b) Increase to 120%
of the reserve requirement on deposits in local currency to non-resident agents; and, (c)
Substitution of the certicates for term deposits as instrument of sterilization to avoid
the resale of other instruments in local currency to non-resident agents and its subsequent
replacement by BCR paper.
Also some macro-prudential measures were put in place by the Superintendence of Banks
(SBS) and the Treasury. The SBS cut the limit for long net foreign position for banks
from 75 to 60 percent; it also limited the amount of daily and weekly FX operations
by pension funds and recently has pre-published a norm that limits the long-position in
of this valuation eect, some central banks register it in the Prot and Losses report, while others register
it in a separated item in the Capital account. From an economic point of view the change of valuation
in local currency of the international reserves is not relevant. An example can illustrate that, since it
could be meaningless to register and distribute dividends originated in a depreciation of the currency
that increases the nominal amount of international reserves.
9derivatives for banks of 40 percent of their net worth.
On the other hand, the Treasury has taxed the capital gains generated by forward con-
tracts with a tax rate of 30 percent, and recently it has issued in the international markets
bonds denominated in domestic currency but paid in foreign currency, an operation that
increased the demand for foreign currency by those domestic agents that purchased those
bonds. The BCR increased the limit on foreign investment of the pension funds from
17% to 30% in 2010.
5 Reserve Requirements
The liquidity accumulation of foreign currency by the nancial intermediaries has been
determined mainly by macro prudential policies. In particular, the BCR uses reserve
requirements to manage capital ows and at the same time accumulate a buer stock of
international reserves. For instance, during the capital-inow episode of the rst quarter
2008, the Central Bank raised the reserve requirements in domestic and foreign currency,
combining this policy with a series of other measures aimed at discouraging holdings of
central bank instruments by non-resident investors. The rate of marginal reserve require-
ments in domestic currency was raised from 6.0 to 25:0% (Table 3); the rate of reserve
requirements for deposits of non residents to 120%, the rate of marginal reserve require-
ments in foreign currency was raised from 30% to 49%2.
Also, due to the Quantitative Easing measures in the developed world, we observed a
resurgence of the capital inows during the second part of 2010. In this case the BCR,
resumed its reserve requirement policies raising them to 25% in domestic currency, to
55% in foreign currency, and to 75% for the external short term liabilities of the nan-
cial system; also, reinstated the reserve requirement ratio for domestic currency deposits
of non-resident investors to 120%. Observing a higher dynamism of the lending to the
domestic market from domestic banks subsidiaries abroad, the BCR also included their
liabilities within the total liabilities subject to reserve requirements3.
In Rossini and Quispe (2010), it is described the credit crunch event in Peru of 1999-
2001, as caused by the combination of an initial surge of capital inows and a subsequent
expansion of banking credit, followed by a sharp contraction of credit produced by a
sudden-stop of capital ows combined with a sharp currency depreciation originated by
the Russian crisis of 1998. In Figure 8, it is shown the evolution of the banking credit as
a proportion of GDP, including a band of +/- 2 standard deviations of credit/GDP ratio
over the sample constructed around a smoothed series by Hodrick-Prescott lter, which
can be used to identify periods of excessive credit expansion or contraction. As it can
be veried the after the recovery from the nancial crisis, credit has been evolving inside
this band.
2During the intensication of the global nancial crisis in the last quarter of 2008, the reserve require-
ments were reduced in order to avoid a credit contraction.
3In September 2007, the Central Bank eliminated the reserve requirements for external loans with
2-year or longer maturities of commercial banks in order to extend their maturities. The longer term
external funding of banks increased from 17% of total external funding in October to 50% in December
2007
10Figure 8: Peru: Credit/GDP Ratio: 1993-2010 (Annual ratios from quarterly data,
in percentages)
Table 3: Peru: Monetary Policy interest rate and reserve requirement ratios,
2006   2011
116 Real Exchange Rates
The nominal appreciation of the exchange rate caused by the capital inows raised the
concerns about the negative eect of this situation on the tradable sectors. To asses this
impact we study the data of the real exchange rate and evaluate the deviations from the
equilibrium real exchange rate. In both cases, the case of Peru shows that the surge of
capital inows has not involved a major negative eect on competitiveness.
In Figure 9 we present the evolution of the index of the eective real exchange rate and
it can be observed that it has been around +/-5% of the average level of the period 1993-
2010. This relative stable real exchange rate can ratify in international comparasions. In
Table 4, the comparative coecient of variability among 22 countries shows that the Real
Eective Exchange Rate (RER) of the Peruvian currency is the 3rd less volatile for the
period December 1994 to December 2010. Moreover, for a shorter period, from January
2001 to December 2010, Peru shows the least volatile RER.
Figure 9: Eective Real Exchange Rate(Index based on 1993 2010 average = 100)
Table 4: Coecient of Variability of the Eective Real Exchange Rate
12We use the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) method to estimate the
equilibrium real exchange rate. Table 5 shows the estimated elasticities of the RER from
its fundamental determinants4. According to the estimations, this approach shows no
mayor misalignments of the RER with respect to its equilibrium path (Figure 10).
7 Concluding Remarks
The Central Bank of Peru has developed a policy framework based on a risk management
approach. In this sense, the vulnerabilities associated to the partial dollarization of
the banking system has been taken into account to add non conventional policy tools
like intervention in the foreign exchange market, accumulation of international reserves,
application of dierent forms of reserve requirements and dierent forms of liquidity
sterilization. With this policy framework the Peruvian economy was relatively isolated
from the eects of the global nancial crisis and able to recover the path of growth with
low ination and to avoid major disruptions from the surge of capital inows.
Table 5: Empirical Results
Figure 10: Peru: Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate
4The calculations are based on Rodr guez and Winkelried (2011)
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